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Utility Law
By LAURA L. MURRELL* AND WILLIAM R. DEXTER**
INTRODUCTION
Changing economic conditions in the past decade, coupled
with rapidly improving technology and an increasing demand
for service, have led to a significant increase in the number of
utility cases decided by Kentucky courts. Some of these cases
have considered such intricate aspects of utility rate law as rate
base, rates of return and allowable expenses. Many more cases
have involved the standard of review to be applied to decisions
made by the Kentucky Public Service Commission (PSC or Com-
mission). Under an old and previously unexplained statute, par-
ties must show that the Commission's order was"'unlawful or un-
reasonable."' Kentucky courts, applying this limited standard of
review, have concluded that courts must abstain from interfering
with the ratemaking process.2 This Survey will discuss utility
cases decided by Kentucky appellate courts through December of
1981 and analyze the scope of judicial review in cases originally
heard by the PSC.
Sole practitioner, Frankfort, Kentucky. J.D., 1967, University of Kentucky. For-
merly Kentucky Assistant Attorney General for Utility Intervention, 1970-1976.
J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
'KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.410 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 545 S.W.2d 927,
931 (Ky. 1976). The rationale for a limited role for the courts was expressed in Glick, Inde-
pendent Judicial Review ofAdministrative Rate-Making: The Rise and Demise of the Ben
Avon Doctrine, 40 FoRDHAM L. REV. 305 (1971):
A rule that permits easy access to the courts undermine[s] the finality and
authority of administrative rate-making by permitting utilities to entirely
ignore such rates by crying "confiscation" and seeking judicial review. The
courts are then faced with the onerous task of sifting through volumes of
economic data and generally contradictory expert testimony without the
refined expertise of the specialists who sit on public service commissions and
attempting to arrive at a more enlightened judgment than the ad-
ministrative body that has already undertaken the task. Not only does this
tend to unnecessarily burden our already overworked trial courts, but it also
tends to decrease the quality of the determination by imposing a Herculean
task on trial court judges, many of whom are simply not up to it.
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I. JURISDICTION AND HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION
The PSC is charged with the regulation of all matters con-
cerning the intrastate operation of utilities subject to its jurisdic-
tion,3 which extends over all non-municipal electric, gas, tele-
phone, water and sewer companies. 4 It has authority over tariff
provisions, 5 certificates of convenience and necessity for major
construction6 and the issuance of securities.7 It also has jurisdic-
tion over customer service complaints lodged against regulated
utilities."
The Commission has undergone some fairly substantial
changes in recent years. Until 1972, the Public Service Commis-
sion consisted of three part-time commissioners. 9 It had jurisdic-
tion over electric, gas, telephone, and water companies. 10 Legis-
lation in 1972 increased the number of commissioners to five." In
1974, sewer companies were added to the Commission's jurisdic-
tion.12 Four years later, the Commission was divided into two
agencies, the Energy Regulation Commission with three full-
time commissioners exercising jurisdiction over electric and gas
companies, and the Utility Regulatory Commission with three
part-time members exercising jurisdiction over telephone, water
and sewer companies. 13 The two Commissions shared a single
staff.
In 1980, by executive order, Governor John Y. Brown, Jr.
abolished the two Commissions and re-established a single Public
3 KRS § 278.040 (1981).
4 KRS § 278.010 (1981).
5 KRS § 278.040(2) (1981).
6 KRS § 278.020 (1981).
7 KRS S 278.300 (1981).
8 KRS § 278.260 (1981).
9 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 145, § 2(b), 1934 Ky. Acts 580, 5831
10 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 145, § 4(a), 1934 Ky. Acts 580,588.
n Act of Mar. 10, 1972, ch. 47, § 1, 1972 Ky. Acts 142, 143 (amending KRS §
278.050(1972)).
12 Act of Mar. 22, 1974, ch. 118, § 1, 1974 Ky. Acts 223, 223 (amending KRS §
278.010(3) (0 (1972)).
13 Act of Mar. 30,1978, ch. 379, § 1,1978 Ky. Acts 1026.2,1026.2-1028 (codified as
KRS §§ 278.040, 278.050 (1981)).
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Service Commission.14 The reorganization was approved by the
1982 General Assembly.'5
This Survey discusses decisions involving the three different
agencies, all of which will be referred to as the "Commission"
since they are but variations of the same agency. Although the
structure and title of the Commission have changed substantial-
ly, the basic statutes governing utility regulation have not
changed significantly since the Commission was originally estab-
lished in 1934.18
II. REVIEW UNDER KENTUCKYS STATUTORY SCHEME
Appeals which are taken from orders made by the Commis-
sion are governed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
278.410, which provides that appeals are to be taken first to the
Franklin Circuit Court. 17 Subsequent appeals are to the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court. 18
Given the frequency of rate cases, appeals are often mooted be-
fore a decision is reported since the granting of higher rates in a
subsequent case usually leaves the appellate court with nothing
to decide.
14 Exec. Order No. 80-1010 of Governor John Y. Brown, Jr. (Nov. 21, 1980), anno-
tated in Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.040 (Banks-Baldwin 1981) (effective Mar. 1,1981).
15 Act of Mar. 10, 1982, ch. 82, § 9, 1982 Ky. Acts 143, 148 (codified as KRS §
278.050).
16 Act of June 14,1934, ch. 145, § 2(a), 1934 Ky. Acts 580,583. New York and Wis-
consin were the first states to establish full-powered public service commissions. Welch,
Status of Regulatory Commissions Under the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32 CEO. L.J.
136 (1944). In 1898, the United States Supreme Court, in a case involving railroad freight
rates fixed by a state legislature, recognized the need for regulatory agencies. In Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Court stated that questions of compensation and due pro-
cess could be "more easily determined by a commission composed of persons whose special
skill, observation and experience" qualified them to do justice to such complex problems.
Id. at527.
17 KRS §278.410 (1981).
18 KRS § 278.450 (1981). For a discussion of alternative procedures for review of
state public service commission decisions, see Uthus & McIntire, Public Utility Rate Reg-
ulation and the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act-Extending Maximum Procedural
Protection to Public Utilities at Public Expense, 26 DnAxE L. BEv. 483 (1976-77). The
authors note that 12 jurisdictions have a two-stage appeal with venue at the first level in a
specified court like the Kentucky plan. Fifteen states provide for mandatory direct review
of final commission orders in the highest court of the state. Id. at 507.
1981-821
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The standard of review set forth in KRS section 278.430 pre-
scribes that "the party seeking to set aside any determination, re-
quirement, direction or order of the commission shall have the
burden of proof to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that
the determination, requirement, direction or order is unreason-
able or unlawful."'19
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE RATEMAKING FUNCTION
A. The Basic Test: "Unlawful or Unreasonable" Strictly Con-
strued
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Kentucky spoke forcefully re-
garding the scope of judicial review in Commonwealth ex rel.
Stephens v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.13 The case was an
appeal by the Attorney General's Division of Consumer Protec-
tion from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court that permitted
South Central Bell to charge higher interim rates pending final
appeal. Pursuant to KRS section 278.180, South Central Bell had
filed a notice with the Commission to increase rates. The Com-
mission had suspended these rates for a period of five months,2'
but, when no decision was reached by the Commission within
this five month period, Bell put the higher rates into effect, sub-
ject to a refund.22 When the Commission entered an order pre-
scribing substantially lower rates, South Central Bell appealed
and kept the higher rates in effect. The Attorney General filed a
motion in Franklin Circuit Court that would have required
South Central Bell to cease charging the higher rates. The tele-
phone company then filed a motion for a temporary injunction
that would have permitted it to collect the higher rates. The cir-
cuit court granted the temporary injunction after finding that
the telephone company would be permanently deprived of rev-
19 KRSS 278.430 (1981).
0 545 S.W.2d at 927.
21 KRS § 278.190(2) (1981) grants to the Commission the authority to suspend a util-
ity's proposed rates for five months to allow the agency to adequately investigate the util-
ity's request.
2 Id. At the conclusion of the statutory five month suspension period, if the Com-
mission has not reached a decision, the utility can put its full rate request into effect, sub-
ject to refund upon the Commission's final determination. Id.
[Vol. 70
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enues from the rates ultimately established, since such rates
could not be retroactively collected. The circuit court's order was
appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court by the Attorney Gen-
eral.
The Supreme Court's decision dealt only with interim relief
pending an appeal from the Commission, but the language of the
opinion was much broader and addressed the standard of review
for appeals from the Commission. On the relief issue, the Court
held that under the statutory scheme injunctive relief was not
available on the mere basis of a reduction in revenue. The Court
concluded:
If we extend the rationale of the circuit court to its ulti-
mate conclusion, we find that in every case in which a utility is
either awarded a rate increase less than it sought or directed to
make a rate reduction, it is entitled to charge the higher rate,
subject to refund, until all appeals are exhausted.0
Based on the assumption that the Commission rates were within
a "zone of reasonableness," the Court stated that injunctive relief
was available only to prevent confiscation, not to prevent a mere
reduction in revenue.2 Thus, the opinion interpreted Kentucky's
statutory term "unreasonable," in the standard of "unreasonable
or unlawful," to be equivalent to "confiscatory." z This interpre-
tation followed therposition of the United States Supreme Court,
expressed in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co.2 The Kentucky Supreme Court declared in Commonwealth
ex rel. Stephens v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.:
By long standing usage in the field of rate regulation the "low-
est reasonable rate" is one which is not confiscatory in the con-
stitutional sense. Assuming that there is a zone of reasonable-
ness within which the legislature or its designee is free to fix a
23 545 S.W.2d at 930.
24 Id. (citing South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 236 So.2d
813 (La. 1970)).
25 Id. In the landmark United States Supreme Court case, Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943), the Court stated that rates are nonconfisca-
tory, just and reasonable so long as they enable the utility to operate successfully, to main-
tain its financial integrity, to attract capital and to compensate its investors for the risk as-
sumed. Id. at 605.
26 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
1981-82]
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rate varying in amount and higher than a confiscatory rate it is
also free to decrease any rate which is not the "lowest reason-
able rate."27
The Court also described the proper scope of judicial review,
noting that ratemaking is a legislative, rather than a judicial
function.2 This power to set rates may be exercised by the legisla-
ture directly-or through an appropriate agency. The Court em-
phasized that KRS chapter 278, which delegates the power to fix
rates to the Commission, presented "a unified and symmetrical
scheme for the exercise of the legislative power of ratemaking."2
In colorful language Justice Lukowsky stated the general ap-
proach to be taken by courts in reviewing legislative ratemaking:
"We read the legislative mandate as directing us to keep our judi-
cial fingers out of the ratemaking pie except to the degree that
the constitutions require our intervention." 30 The decision there-
fore established a narrow approach to the entire question of judi-
cial review.
B. Newly Discovered Evidence as a Basis for Judicial Remand
KRS section 278.440 provides that actions brought to gain ju-
dicial review of Commission orders must be heard only on the
evidence submitted to the Commission as shown by the tran-
script.31 In addition, the statute provides that the court may re-
mand the record and proceedings to the Commission to consider
evidence discovered after the Commission hearing, if that evi-
27 545 S.W.2d at 931 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575 (1942)).
28 Id. This is an important distinction because the authority given to the Commission
by the legislature is not an authority that could he exercised by a court. In American
Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 379
S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964), the Court stated that this legislative function could not be del-
egated to the courts, either directly or through de novo review. There is, therefore, under
this line of cases, a Kentucky constitutional limit on the breadth of judicial review of pub-
lic service commission orders in addition to the statutory limit.
29 545 S.W.2d at 931.
30 Id. The late Justice Lukowsky went on to note that "constitutions and statutes,
like the Salvation Army, aid the needy not the greedy." Id. at 932.
Id. at 932.
31 KRS § 278.440 (1981).
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dence could not have been obtained for use at the hearing and if
it materially affects the case. In Stephens v. Kentucky Utilities
Co.,32 the electric utility argued that this statute not only pro-
vides for remand for "newly-discovered evidence" in the tradi-
tional sense, but also authorizes remand by the Court for "new
evidence" based on actual operating experience subsequent to the
Commission's order."- It argued in the alternative that the statute
establishes an inherent power in the trial court to have this "new
evidence" considered so that a proper determination of the con-
fiscation issue can be insured.Y
Because the Commission failed to decide on the utility's re-
quested rate change within the five month statutory period,",
Kentucky Utilities (KU) put its total rate request into effect sub-
ject to refund and, as a result, collected funds in excess of the
rates ultimately prescribed by the Commission. The higher rates,
which were supposed to be subject to refund, were collected dur-
ing the appeal of the Commission's decision.-" KU was granted
higher rates in a subsequent Commission case. Instead of refund-
ing the excess funds collected during the pendency of the appeal
however, KU sought to retain the funds on the theory that its ac-
tual experience, subsequent to the data on which the Commis-
sion's order was based, showed confiscation. The Franklin Cir-
cuit Court agreed with KU and remanded the case to the Com-
mission with directions to consider this "new evidence" pursuant
to KRS section 278.440. The Attorney General's attempt to ap-
peal the remand order was dismissed by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals on the grounds that a remand order was not an appeal-
able order.
The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review
and declared that under KRS section 278.440 an order of remand
by the trial court to consider newly discovered evidence would
not be an appealable order.37 However, the Court distinguished
32 569 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1978).
33 Id. at 158.
34 Id.
35 KRS§ 278.190 (1981).36 The rates were collected under an injunction comparable to the one issued in
Commonwealth ex. rel Stephens v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. See notes 20-30 supra and
the accompanying text for a discussion of Bell.
37 569 S.W.2d at 158. The Court noted that such a remand procedure is similar to
1981-821
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the action taken by the Franklin Circuit Court in the instant
case, stating that the trial court "in effect dictate[d] a different
trial on [totally] new evidence in complete disregard of the legis-
lative mandate for judicial review."," The Court characterized
the action by the trial court as an attempted "judicial amend-
ment" to KRS section 278.440, and found the order appealable.3
The Kentucky Utilities Court also rejected the contention
that evidence of actual experience under a rate order can be con-
sidered upon judicial review in determining confiscation. Justice
Stephenson, noting that neither Kentucky's statutory scheme nor
public policy would permit such an interpretation, stated:
If we were to accept the rationale of the order entered by
the trial court and the argument of Kentucky Utilities, there
would not be much point in the Public Service Commission
holding a hearing. In each case, the situation after the hearing
would be the determining factor and this would result in com-
plete destruction of an orderly process in the legislative scheme
for setting rates for utilities. Public policy dictates that these
actions not be unnecessarily prolonged.40
The Court specifically overruled Lexington Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission4' and City of Lexington v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,42 in which the Court of Appeals, then Ken-
tucWkys highest court, had approved remand orders to consider
subsequent developments.43
C. Relationship of Revenue Requirements and Rates
The most significant recent appellate decision discussing the
scope of judicial review of ratemaking decisions by the Commis-
sion is Energy Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Power Co.4
the concept of a new trial provided in KY. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g), or to relief from judgment
under KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b).
31569 S.W.2d at 158.
3 9 Id.
40 Id.
41224 S.W.2d423 (Ky. 1949).
42 249 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1952).
43 569 S.W.2d at 159.
44 No. 80-CA-384-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1980), rev'd, 623 S.W.2d 904 (Ky.
1981).
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The procedural history of the case is confusing. Kentucky Power
had sought a rate increase that would generate $9,804,000 per
year, but the Commission allowed only $7,020,366. The utility
did not appeal this portion of the Commission's order, but rather
contended that the rates which the Commission had set would
not produce the revenue which the Commission had approved.
The Franklin Circuit Court remanded the case to the Commis-
sion, but set time limits on its consideration. When those time
limits had expired, the court ordered the Commission to imple-
ment a schedule of rates fixed by the court.45
The court of appeals held that the circuit court had com-
mitted reversible error and had "effectively prescribed new rates
for the Company, thereby usurping the function of the Commis-
sion."46 It further held that the circuit court had abused its dis-
cretion when it refused to allow the Commission to complete its
consideration of the case on remand and declared that such ac-
tion "was an unlawful intrusion into the ratemaking authority of
the agency." 47 The court concluded that "[w]hen an administra-
tive agency has made an error of law, the obligation of the court
is to remand the case to provide an opportunity to examine the
evidence and findings of fact as required by law."48
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. 49 A-ter.reciting the
history of the case, the Supreme Court recognized "that it is not a
judicial function to fix utility rates," but nonetheless held that
the circuit court had not acted improperly when it had merely
4 Id., slip op. at 2-4.
46 Id., slip op. atS.
47 Id. See also FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976).
There the Court held that a reviewing court may not dictate to the agency the time dimen-
sions of any needed inquiry or order the results to be reported to it without opportunity for
further consideration of new evidence by the agency. Id. at 333. In Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court stated that reviewing courts
cannot dictate the terms and scope of a remand proceeding because the agency must be
free to fashion its own rules of procedure.
48 No. 80-CA-384-MR, slip op. at 7. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT
§S 16.01-.05 (3ded. 1972).
49 Kentucky Power Co. v. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 623 S.W.2d 904 (1981).
50 Id. at 907. The Court further acknowledged that a public regulatory agency must
have broad latitude in the conduct ofits proceedings. Id.
1981-82]
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attempted to implement the Commission's basic findings that ad-
ditional revenues were required.5' The Court dwelt at length on
the delay in the proceedings before the Commission and the sub-
stantial period of time during which the data was available to the
Commission and its staff. The Court further held that the re-
mand was proper under KRS section 278.440 since it was "to
hear new evidence that could not have been obtained by the
Company prior to the original hearing (to wit, that the rates
thereafter fixed by the Commission would not in fact achieve its
stated purpose of producing an annual increase of $7,020,366)."52
The basis of the opinion was seemingly a determination that
the Commission did not deal fairly with the company. The Su-
preme Court noted that the circuit court had declined to "let the
Commission staff toy with the case any longer."53 It further ob-
served that "[e]ven a public utility has some rights, one of which
is the right to a final determination of its claim within a reason-
able time and in accordance with due process. This Company
has been wooled around long enough."'' Although the case did
not seem to change the outline of judicial review, it demon-
strated how judicial intervention can provide a remedy when the
court perceives that the Commission has not dealt fairly with a
utility. Thus, the Supreme Court in Kentucky Power held that a
court can intervene but admonished that it must not get into the
actual process of setting rates.- Despite this admonition, the
Court required the Commission to accept the method and the
figures presented by Kentucky Power which the Commission had
failed to rebut. Furthermore, the Court was convinced that the
fundaniental decision of how much additional revenue a utility
should earn was to be made solely by the Commission.5
51 Id. at 908.
52 Id. at 907.
53 Id. at908.
54 Id.
55 Id.
M Id. Compare the Kentucky Supreme Court's position with the forceful language
used by the court of appeals in refusing to impose an affirmative duty on the Commission
to rebut evidence presented before the Energy Regulatory Commission. Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n v. Kentucky Power Co., 605 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). See the
text accompanying note 78 infra for a discussion of the Commission's duty.
57 623 S.W.2d at 908. The Court characterized "rates" as "merely the means de-
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D. Adequacy of Service in Ratemaking Case
A recent court of appeals decision discussed judicial review.
In Beshear v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., the Commis-
sion found that an overall rate of return of 10.61% was reason-
able, but also found that South Central Bell had failed to fulfill
its service obligation adequately. 9 Because of this failure, the
Commission reduced the rate of return to 10.47% as a penalty
intended to induce the company to improve its service. 10
Upon review the Franklin Circuit Court reversed, stating
that inadequate service "was not germane to the rate-making
process" and holding that the penalty was unconstitutional and
confiscatory.61 The trial court enjoined the enforcement of the
penalty and directed the Commission to implement the higher
rate. This judgment was taken to the court of appeals. Noting
that the trial court had left no discretion to the Commission, the
court of appeals held that the lower court was acting as a "rate
maker" whether it set the rates itself or ordered the Commission
to set them at some particular level. 62 Such action was considered
to be outside the scope of judicial review and specifically prohib-
ited by Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. South Central Bell
Telephone Co. 3
The relationship between rates and the adequacy of service is
set forth in KRS section 278.030, which states that "[e]very util-
ity may demand, collect and receive fair, just and reasonable
rates for the service rendered or to be rendered by it to any per-
son. '" Relying on this statute, the court of appeals in Beshear v.
South Central Bell Telephone Co. held that the Commission was
correct in considering inadequacy of service in its ratemaking
procedure.6 The court reviewed the provisions of KRS chapter
signed for achieving a predetermined objective, which in this instance was how much ad-
ditional revenue should the Company be allowed to earn." Id.
5 No. 81-CA-530-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 18,1981).
59 Id., slip op. at 2.
60Id.
61 Id.,slipop. at3.
62Id., slip op. at 4.
6 545 S.W.2d at 927. See the text accompanying notes 20-30 supra for a more de-
tailed discussion of Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.
6 KRS § 278.030(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
65 Beshear v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 81-CA-530-MR, slip op. at 6.
1981-821
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278, and concluded that the legislature not only authorized, but
also directed the Commission to review the quality of service of a
public utility when undertaking to set rates." Although this sta-
tutory interpretation allows the Commission to make such an
evaluation of service, its decision is still subject to judicial review
under the "unlawful or unreasonable" standard.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NON-RATEMAKING PROCEEDINGS
While most utility litigation involves rates and ratemaking
procedures, a significant number of utility cases deal with other
matters. In addition to the important ratemaking function, the
Commission is charged under KRS chapter 278 with the regula-
tion of certificates of convenience and necessity for major con-
struction projects,67 the regulation of a utility's authority to issue
securities"s and jurisdiction over customer service complaints .69
A. Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity
In Energy Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Power Co. ,70
the court of appeals considered the scope of judicial review in a
proceeding dealing with Kentucky Power's application for a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity and a grant of au-
.thority to.-borrow fundg in order to purchase an interest in an,
electric generating plant. Kentucky Power wanted to purchase
this interest as insurance against any possible shortage of electric-
ity. The Commission denied the certificate, finding that poten-
tial shortage could be remedied by buying electricity from an af-
filiated utility. Franklin Circuit Court reversed this decision be-
66 Id. at7.
67 KRS § 278.020 (1981).
68 KRS § 278.300 (1981).
69 KRS § 278.260 (1981).
70 605 S.W.2d at 46. The court stated that the Commission was acting in a "quasi-
judicial" capacity when it considered a request for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. Id. at 50. However, the court noted that the decision should be based on what
best serves the public interest. Such a policy decision should be more accurately described
as "quasi-legislative."
[Vol. 70
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cause the Commission "failed to rebut certain allegations regard-.
ing the need for and the cost of the new generating facility."7'
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit
court and remanded the matter to the Commission because the
Commission "made only conclusions of law" and "failed to make
findings of specific evidentiary facts."72 The court pointed out
that findings of such evidentiary facts are required by Marshall
County v. South Central Bell Telephone Co. 73 and are necessary
in order to sustain or reverse an order of the Commission.74 De-
spite this resolution of the case, the court went on to emphasize
important principles of judicial review.
The court stated that the scope of judicial review in these
non-ratemaking administrative actions is also limited.75 Under
KRS section 278.430, a party seeking to set aside a determination
of the Commission regarding a certificate of convenience and
necessity has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the determination was unreasonable or unlawful. The
court found that no clear and convincing evidence had been pre-
sented to show that the Commission's denial was unreasonable or
unlawful, and thus held that the circuit court had improperly
substituted its judgment for that of the trier of fact.76 Addition-
ally, the court announced a very strict definition for the "un-
reasonable" standard, stating that "the term unreasonable can be
-applied to an administrative agency's deoision'only when it'is de-,
termined that the evidence presented leaves no room for differ-
ence of opinion among reasonable minds." 77
71 Id. at49.
72 Id.
73 519 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Ky. 1975).
74 605S.W.2d at 49.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 50. See Thurman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1961).
Cf. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 538 P.2d 702,
713 (Kan. 1975) (stating that "only when the commission's determination is so wide of the
mark as to be outside the realm of fair debate can the court nullify it") (emphasis added).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found "unreasonable" to be confiscation on the low
end of the range and "excessive or extortionate" on the high end. Legislative Util. Con-
sumers' Council v. Public Serv. Co., 402 A.2d 626, 632 (N.H. 1979). See also Claiborne
Elec. Coop. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388 So. 2d 792, 797 (La. 1980) (statingthat
1981-82]
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Another important issue raised in the case was whether the
Commission has a duty to refute evidence submitted to it by an
applicant who has the burden of proving a matter. The circuit
court had ruled that the Commission is required to come forward
with an affirmative case whenever an applicant makes a prima
facie case before the Commission. The court of appeals emphat-
ically rejected this requirement which would have essentially
shifted the burden of proof from the applicant to the Commis-
sion. The court stated: "Standing alone, unimpeached, unex-
plained and unrebutted evidence may or may not be so persua-
sive that it would be clearly 'unreasonable for the board to be
convinced by it .... There are some questions .and circum-
stances in which no evidence is required to support a negative
finding."78
This combination of holdings-that the Commission has no
duty to refute evidence submitted to it and that the agency deci-
sion will be unreasonable only when reasonable minds could not
differ-seems to make agency decisions virtually unreviewable. 79
B. Rules, Regulations, Practices or Service of a Utility
KRS section 278.280 empowers the Commission to determine
and fix just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules
and regulations for intrastate utilities.A0 An interpretation of this
statute can be found in Croke v. Public Service Commission.81 In
1973, in the face of a natural gas shortage, Louisville Gas & Elec-
tric (LG&E) sought, and the Commission granted, restrictions
judicial review only considers whether commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of authority); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Conm'n of Ohio, 400
N.E.2d 396, 398 (Ohio 1980) (stating that a finding is unreasonable if the record reveals
that it is so manifestly against the weight of evidence as to show misapprehension, mistake
or willful disregard of duty).
78 605 S.W.2d at 50. The court relied on Lee v. International Harvester Co., 373
S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1963).
79 On remand, the Commission granted Kentucky Power the authority to purchase
the interest in the generating plant by order dated Sept. 28, 1981. The Attorney General
has filed suit in Franklin Circuit Court to enjoin this order. Beshear v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, No. 81-CI-1349 (Franklin Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 15,1981).
80 KRS § 278.280 (1981).
81 573 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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on new or expanded service.82 Pursuant to the Commission's or-
der, LG&E adopted a tariff that included rules and regulations
prohibiting the transfer of entitlement to gas service unless the
entitlement at the old location was terminated. This tariff was
properly adopted by LG&E and approved by the Commission.
However, the Commission subsequently ordered LG&E to trans-
fer certain gas entitlements in violation of the company's rules
and regulations as set forth in the Commission-approved tariff.
The Commission's order to transfer the entitlements was af-
firmed by the Franklin Circuit Court.
In one of the few cases applying the "unlawful" prong of the
standard of judicial review, the court of appeals held in Croke
that the Commission was without authority to order such a trans-
fer in violation of the company's properly adopted tariff.8a3 The
court noted that the Commission's powers are purely statutory,84
but nonetheless stated that the Commission clearly had the au-
thority to change LG&E's rule, as long as the agency followed
the appropriate statutory procedures.8
C. Hybrid: Consideration of Need for Certificates of Conve-
nience and Necessity in a Rate Hearing
In American District Telegraph Co. v. Utility Regulatory
Commission,O the Kentucky Court of Appeals seemed tempted
to substitute its judgment on review for the decision reached by
the PSC. In the final analysis, however, it did not do so because
the Commission's order was not shown to be unreasonable or un-
lawful by clear and satisfactory evidence. In American District,
the telegraph company (ADT) had intervened in a South Central
Bell rate request. ADT claimed that it was improper to consider
the telephone company's sizable construction projects in the rate
base without first obtaining certificates of public convenience
and necessity. 1 The Commission and the Franklin Circuit Court
82 Id. at 928.
83 Id. at930.
84 Id. at 929.
&5 Id. at 930.
619 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
87 Id. at505.
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each held that South Central Bell's construction and extensions
were nade in the usual course of business and that any consider-
ation of a need for a certificate of convenience and necessity
would be inappropriate in a rate hearing. 8
The court of appeals acknowledged that "[r] ate hearings and
hearings for certificates of convenience and necessity are each
very complicated proceedings" and that "[t]o mix the two could
present obvious problems for resolving either."8 9 However, the
court seemed to suggest that joint consideration could be appro-
priate if "a specific challenge to any project or group of projects,
other than to the annual program," were made.10 Underscoring
the importance of the issue raised in the case, the court com-
mented: "the appellants have made a strong case factually, and
they have raised some serious points for concern and consider-"
ation. They must not be taken lightly by this Court, the Commis-
sion, or the legislature." 9' Despite this concern, the court ana-
lyzed the Commission's order under the standard of review set
forth in KRS section 278.430 and concluded that the appellants
had failed to establish that the order was unreasonable or unlaw-
ful.92 Thus, the court once again affirmed the limited scope of ju-
dicial review in administrative proceedings.
88 Id. at 506-07.
89 Id. at507.90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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